

VZCZCXRO7705
PP RUEHDT
DE RUEHDT #0267 2730824
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 300824Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4562
INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 1069
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0060
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1333
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 4106

UNCLAS DILI 000267

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/CT, INL, DS, DS/DSS/IP, DS/T/ATA, DS/IP/EAP

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PTER](#) [PREL](#) [TT](#)

SUBJECT: TIMOR-LESTE: REQUEST FOR ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE TRAINING

¶1. (SBU) Embassy Dili would like to request an Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training assessment to address two separate critical areas of vulnerability for the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL). First, the Secretary of State for Security has requested assistance from the Ambassador in providing some basic training on border management for the PNTL border guards along the 142 mile land border with Indonesia. Second, we would like to offer a VIP protection course to the PNTL Close Protection Unit with the intent of requesting a PNTL Close Protection Detail for our Ambassador.

Land Border with Indonesia Vulnerable to Trafficking, Terrorists

----- -

¶2. (SBU) In a recent meeting with the Ambassador, Secretary of State for Security Francisco Guterres lamented the fact that neither the U.N. nor other bilateral donors have provided the GOTL with assistance in training the PNTL on how to manage the long land border with Indonesia. He specifically expressed his concern that the border is virtually wide open to traffickers and terrorists traveling from Indonesia and requested U.S. assistance in training the border guards. In a subsequent meeting, he noted that he had turned away a number of suspicious tourist visa applications from a group of Afghans in Kuala Lumpur. He also remarked that the GOTL is looking at tightening visa restrictions and blocking overland entries to certain third country nationals. (Note: In addition to Guterres, both Prime Minister Gusmao and Director-General of the National Intelligence Service Cristovao also noted their increasing concern regarding Timor-Leste's vulnerability to these threats.). Our own consultations with other international partners confirm that the PNTL has not received significant assistance in this area (e.g., the Australians are more concerned with the maritime border and stemming the tide of illegal immigrants using Timor-Leste as a stepping stone into Australia).

VIP Protection

¶3. (SBU) Separately, Embassy Dili would like to address our own vulnerability by securing close protection services for our Ambassador. Although the current and previous Ambassador have not had protection, other senior international diplomats do have their own internal close protection units. While we believe that the current threat level remains low, we are eager to eliminate a major vulnerability that could leave us an easy target to a terrorist attack or criminal assault. We believe that with the proper incentive, the PNTL would be eager to

assume this responsibility. One such incentive would be specialized VIP protection training for their Close Protection Unit. Another would be the prestige attached to having the practical experience of providing such protection to the Ambassador and visiting senior U.S. delegations.

Justification

14. (SBU) Embassy Dili feels strongly that ATA training in these two areas would be a significant step towards reducing Timor-Leste's and our own vulnerabilities. While the current threat posed by terrorists and traffickers remains low, we believe that it is simply a matter of time before criminal elements seek to exploit Timor-Leste's serious vulnerabilities in this area. In addition, we believe that VIP protection training would be a low-cost means for this Embassy to obtain long-term services of a PNTL Close Protection Detail assigned to the Ambassador and would also enhance local PNTL capacity for providing similar services to senior USG visitors.

KLEMM